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Abstract 
This paper describes a method for achieving strong, multi-factor and mutual authentication from a biometrics-based protocol for 
authenticated key exchange (B-AKE). Operation of the protocol relies on knowledge shared by communicating parties, extracted 
from data collected by biometric sensors. A Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme creates a symmetric encryption key using a 
weak secret, the extracted something-you-know data. This key protects the confidentiality of user credentials and other message 
data transferred during operation of the B-AKE protocol. If the message recipient possesses the same something-you-know 
information as the sender, a key is created, the message decrypted, and mutual authentication achieved. Biometric match data 
recovered from the encrypted message provides a second something-you-are authentication factor. The B-AKE protocol ensures 
users never reveal their knowledge or biometric credentials to imposter recipients or man-in-the-middle observers. Diffie-
Hellman key establishment provides forward secrecy, a highly desirable protocol property, when participants choose fresh 
random values each time they operate the protocol. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of scientific committee of Missouri University of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
Distinctive biometric traits can uniquely identify an individual. Biometrics is the automatic recognition of 
individuals based on these unique traits, the biological (e.g., fingerprint, iris, hand geometry) or behavioral (e.g., gait, 
gesture, keystroke dynamics) characteristics that reliably distinguish one person from another [1]. In an access 
control system, biometrics is the well-known something-you-are factor used for identification and authentication. 
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Biometrics can be coupled with other categories of factors, such as something-you-have and something-you-know, to 
achieve two and three-factor authentication when greater assurance is required than a single factor can provide [1]. 
Traditionally, a distinct source of values has been associated with each type of authentication category. Access 
control systems typically collect values for each authentication factor category separately, perhaps relying on a token 
reader, a keyboard, and a biometric sensor for three-factor authentication.  However, binary data collected from 
biometric sensors contains rich information content not limited to only the physiological and behavioral 
characteristics needed to support biometric matching. 
Sensor collected data can contain human knowledge, something-you-know information. Knowledge extraction 
techniques applied to this data can reveal weak secrets expressed by an individual. These secrets are termed ‘weak’ 
because they are something a person can easily memorize, traditionally a pass phrase, a password, or a personal 
identification number (PIN). Biometric-based weak secrets extend these traditional secrets to also include a sequence 
of footsteps or the “the finger positions and hand postures” used in a gesture or “during communication of hand sign 
languages” [2]. 
A password is a something-you-know authenticator, a string of characters that have an equivalent representation 
shared by communicating parties. This equivalency makes passwords useful as weak secrets in cryptographic key-
agreement schemes, which require both parties to know exactly the same secret in order to establish a shared key to 
ensure secure communications. Though knowledge extracted from biometric sensors can have this useful 
equivalency attribute of passwords, often it does not. 
When an authenticator constructed from knowledge mined from biometric sensor data is suitable for use in 
Diffie-Hellman based authenticated-key exchange (AKE) protocols [3] it can serve in place of a password string. 
However, for the successful operation of these protocols, it is necessary for participants in the exchange to represent 
the knowledge information in a consistent and unambiguous format, such as a canonical encoding based on Abstract 
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [4]. Doing so allows protocol participants to share precisely the same secret 
knowledge required to operate the protocol. 
2. Authenticated-Key Exchange 
Server authentication mechanisms, such as the widely deployed Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, rely on 
strong asymmetric cryptography supported by a resource intensive Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, 
achieving mutual authentication using TLS is not so common. It is more likely for client authentication to rely on 
user passwords, since most users lack the personal digital certificates needed to leverage the mutual authentication 
option of TLS [5]. 
Passwords and other shareable knowledge-based authentication values are “typically used for client-side 
authentication only” [6], with TLS serving to authenticate the server and protect client passwords in transit. Failures 
in TLS server authentication and user errors have led to widespread phishing by attackers impersonating legitimate 
servers to capture user credentials [5].  Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols can help defeat phishing 
attacks, protect passwords using strong cryptography, and provide mutual authentication without support of a PKI. 
The AKE family of protocols provides a strong, lightweight alternative to TLS.  
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols “offer password-based mutual authentication” through 
the “the marriage of password authentication with cryptographic key exchange protocols” [6]. PAKE provides 
communicating parties assurance they know each other (e.g., mutual authentication) and establishes a shared secret, 
a symmetric cryptographic key for secure communications known only to them. With PAKE, user “authentication is 
accomplished implicitly through the capability of establishing an authenticated session key” [6]. PAKE provides a 
strong key exchange mechanism, even when using weak passwords, so long as users protect their passwords from 
exposure to attackers. 
The Biometric-Authenticated Key Exchange (B-AKE) protocols proposed in this paper extend the use of PAKE 
beyond the limitations of character string passwords to more general knowledge representations. B-AKE 
authenticators may be in either character or binary string format, and they may contain human-readable markup or 
other structured content. For protocol processing purposes, B-AKE and PAKE authenticators are both opaque 
strings with no distinguishable internal format or semantics that must be pre-established before protocol operation. 
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Fig.1 defines the schema for representing a user knowledge authenticator in a B-AKE protocol. Type PW is an 
‘open type’, and can contain a value of any ASN.1 type in its encoded form. The type of an encoded value can be 
simple or structured. However, for processing purposes in a B-AKE protocol, an encoded value of type PW is an 
opaque string, a series of octets that are independent of hardware, operating system, or programming language 
considerations. This serialized format is ideal for information exchange between communicating parties that have 
different computing environments. 
 
 
Fig. 1. B-AKE knowledge authentication string. 
Unlike passwords, biometric matching data is not a shareable authenticator, since biometric reference data and 
biometric matching data are not equivalent. A user first enrolls their biometric data to create a reference template 
used later for authentication against the users provided biometric matching data [1]. Even when two biometric 
samples “A and B” are close, “their cryptographic hashes h(A) and h(B) are very different, making h(A) not 
appropriate” for use in a PAKE protocol as a shared authenticator [6].  
Modeled on the international PAKE standard [7], B-AKE is not restricted to only the use of password character 
strings for the value of PW in the key exchange processing defined in the ITU-T X.1035 recommendation. B-AKE 
uses the same processing as the international standard, but allows the use of more general, pre-shared something-
you-know biometric knowledge in both client-side and server-side authentication.  Like the mutual authentication 
option of TLS, but without the overhead of a PKI, B-AKE protocols ensure “mutual authentication of both parties in 
the act of establishing a symmetric cryptographic key via Diffie-Hellman exchange” [7]. Fig. 2 illustrates B-AKE 
protocol operation.    
 
Fig. 2. B-AKE protocol operation. 
By using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the B-AKE protocol ensures “perfect forward secrecy – a property of a 
key establishment protocol. This property guarantees that compromise of a session key or long-term private key 
after a given session does not cause the compromise of any earlier session” [7] when fresh random values are used 
to operate the protocol. Encryption based on a user knowledge credential during operation of the protocol protects 
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the key exchange operation “from the man-in-the-middle attack”, and leaves the weak secret unrevealed “to an 
eavesdropper preventing an off-line dictionary attack” [7]. 
Biometric data may contain embedded user knowledge, such as a passphrase or the spelled out letters in a 
password. When knowledge extraction can mine something-you-know information from biometric sensor data, this 
data can provide both biometric matching data and the shared knowledge required to operate a B-AKE protocol. In 
the case of speaker recognition, a user voiceprint may include a series of words or letters whose binary values can be 
extracted using speech recognition techniques, and then transformed into a character string. 
Biometric collection of user gestures as binary video images can capture similar embedded knowledge. Gestures 
can be in the form of a passphrase or password, or they can represent movements completely unrelated to any 
language. Unlike passwords entered using conventional keyboard devices, user knowledge extracted from biometric 
sensor data requires additional transformation processing before being suitable for use as an authenticator, or as 
input to a B-AKE protocol. 
3. Gestures 
Fong, Zhuang, and Fister [2] describe an image-based, biometric authentication model for hand gestures captured 
by video recordings. The authors demonstrate that a “sequence of hand signs”, such as the those representing the 
letters “‘i’ , ‘l’ , ‘o’ , ‘v’ , ‘e’ , and ‘u” can be encoded as a series of gesture images and used to authenticate the 
claimed identity of an individual [2]. The gestures serve as what the authors refer to as a “biometric password” and 
provide context for biometric feature extraction and biometric matching based on the “hand shape and the postures 
in doing those signs” [2]. 
Their approach achieves two-factor authentication. A something-you-are factor is obtained by matching the 
“slight but unique behavioral characteristics in sign language” presented by the individual to their previously 
enrolled biometric reference data. A something-you-know factor relies on extracting the alphabetic letters associated 
with this sequence of hand signs from images, as shown in Fig. 3.(a), and matching these letters to a previously 
registered user secret [2]. 
 
Fig. 3. (a) Finger-spelled Alphabet [10]           (b) Numbered Finger-spelled Alphabet. 
The process derives two authentication factors from the same biometric sensor data. However, the extracted 
knowledge is not yet in a form suitable for use in an authenticated key exchange protocol. Successful operation of an 
AKE requires the user secret to be in an identical format on the client and server, so that both parties can establish 
the same symmetric key. In the Fong, Zhuang, and Fister model, each hand sign is associated with one character, a 
letter of the alphabet. While their approach allows input of alphabetic and numeric letters, it prohibits the use of 
hand signs for whole words, phrases, concepts, or gestures not tied to an alphabet or language. 
To create a less restrictive collection of hand signs, each letter in the hand sign alphabet can be assigned a 
number (See Fig.3(b)) based on its position in the alphabet (e.g., A=1, B-2 … Z=26), followed by the ten numeric 
letters (e.g., 0=27, 1=28 … 9=36). To extend the collection to include more complex hand signs, such as the 
clinched fist, the hand-over-heart salute, and the benediction gesture, each additional gesture must become a unique 
numeric value. 
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The hand signed letters “‘i’, ‘l’, ‘o’, ‘v’, ‘e’, and ‘u” represented as a sequence of integers, can be the value of an 
ASN.1 relative object identifier type “9.12.15.22.5.21” [4]. This value can be transferred unambiguously in an 
instance of communication in a compact binary format, encoded as the 8-byte hexadecimal value “0D06090C 
0F160515” using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) of ASN.1 [4]. Encoded integer values also can represent 
complex gestures, such as the clinched fist gesture, that are not associated with a signing alphabet in the same way.  
Sae-Bae, Memon, Isbister, and Ahmed investigate “user-defined gestural passwords”, multi-touch gestures for 
user authentication on touch-sensitive devices [8]. Their research leverages the capabilities found frequently on 
mobile devices, such as smart phones and tablet computers. These devices “contain a rich array of sensors that can 
support many authentication methods beyond passwords and PIN codes, including biometrics” [9]. The authors 
focus on gestures using biometric technology that measures “variations in hand geometry and muscle behavior” [8].  
The gesture images collected by their biometric sensors are not associated with any alphabet or language. Instead, 
“a set of canonical gestures were identified by creating a gestural taxonomy based on movement of the palm, the 
fingertips, and the number of fingertips involved in the gesture” [8]. The authors define a “multi-touch gesture” as a 
“time series of the set of x-y coordinates of finger touch points captured as the gesture is being performed” [8]. 
Table 1 provides a partial set of the canonical gesture types defined by the authors. Their type definitions are in 
order by numeric gesture identifier. Each identifier names a unique to a set of annotation text, palm movement, 
fingertip movement, and dynamic fingertip values that define a gesture in a gestural taxonomy table.  
                                                Table 1. Ordered gesture descriptions. 
Gesture 
identifier 
Annotation Palm 
movement 
Fingertip 
movement 
Dynamic 
fingertips 
1 ‘CCW’ Static Circular(CCW) All 
2 ‘CW’ Static Circular(CW) All 
3 ‘Pinch’ Static Close All 
4 ‘Drag’ Dynamic(Ļ) Parallel All 
5 ‘FPO’ Static Open Fixed pinky 
6 ‘FTCW’ Static Circular(CW) Fixed thumb 
7 ‘FTP’ Static Parallel(Ļ) Fixed thumb 
8 ‘Opened’ Static  Open All 
9 ‘Swipe’ Dynamic(ĺ) Parallel All 
10 ‘User-defined’ Dynamic Parallel All 
 
The authors note that for the purposes of biometric matching, the “recognition performance of the proposed 
system” results in error rates that are “still too high for authentication systems” [8]. However, a series of canonical 
gestures “‘CCW’, ‘Pinch’, ‘Drag’, ‘Swipe’, ‘CW’, ‘User-defined’, and ‘FTP”, knowledge extracted from biometric 
sensor data and represented as a sequence of integers can be the value of an ASN.1 relative object identifier type 
“1.3.4.9.2.10.7” [4]. This knowledge value extracted from biometric information can be DER encoded as the 9-byte 
hexadecimal value “0D070103 04090A07” and used as the PW input to B-AKE. Even when a biometric technology 
type is too weak for use as an authenticator, knowledge data collected from biometric sensors can achieve strong 
mutual authentication and create a shared cryptographic key to ensure confidentiality between communicating 
parties.  
4. Conclusions and Future Research 
An authenticated key exchange (B-AKE) protocol can achieve mutual authentication and strong, two-factor user 
authentication with biometric matching data and user knowledge extracted from biometrics sensor data. Neither TLS 
nor the overhead of a PKI is required to achieve mutual authentication or to establish a shared cryptographic key for 
secure communications. B-AKE ensures the confidentiality of user authentication credentials from phishing and 
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man-in-the-middle attacks, and proper operation of the protocol makes forward secrecy possible.  
Future research and development will inform definition of a complete ASN.1 message schema to support B-AKE 
protocol implementations using biometric technologies of any type. This schema will include structured knowledge 
authenticator values that can serve as inputs to the ITU-T X.1035 recommendation. These inputs will be in the form 
of canonical encodings of complex values represented as opaque strings to replace the simple character string 
password inputs defined in the international standard.  
For some biometric technology types, a contrived context for biometric matching can provide the opportunity for 
collecting additional knowledge information from biometric sensor data. From an access control perspective, a 
context used to provide an additional authentication factor can be considered a layer of defence. Yun [11] provides 
such a context for knowledge collection, a “floor-based system, UbiFloorII, which consists of a large number of 
photo interrupter sensors in wooden tiles” used to study gait biometric identification [11].  
The Yun system collects “both the walking and stepping patterns from the walking samples” [11] for gait 
biometric matching using a two-dimensional biometric sensor grid. The order and identities of tiles encountered as 
participants traverse the grid could convey user knowledge through a stepping pattern. A series of identifiers 
mapped to user-selected tiles forming a memorized stepping pattern could serve as the user’s weak secret in a B-
AKE protocol.   
Gait is appealing as a biometric identifier, since sample collection is “unobtrusive and typifies the motion 
characteristics specific to an individual” [11]. Gait measurement does not require user cooperation and the 
characteristics of an individual “can be detected and measured at both a low resolution and a long distance” [11]. 
These attributes make gait biometrics ideal for smart home applications and useful for vehicle and building access 
control. 
Future research will explore the similarities between gait biometrics knowledge extraction using a ‘smart floor’ 
and gesture biometrics knowledge extraction using smart phone touch screens. Both technology types support the 
capture of biometric matching data using a similar ordered grid context useful for collecting knowledge information 
needed to operate a B-AKE protocol. 
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